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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 18, Number 2, Winter 1980
Supreme Court Review of Congressional
Action in the Federalism Area
Philip J. Prygoski*
The truth is that the major premise of most of the great decisions of the
Supreme Court is a concealed bias of some sort-a highly laudable bias
perhaps, yet a bias.'
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court' reviews acts of Congress that in some
way impinge upon the essential rights or attributes of sovereignty of
the states, it engages in an extremely complex, important, and sensi-
tive accommodation of interests. Not only is the Court delineating the
contours of substantive congressional powers, such as the commerce or
taxing and spending powers; it is also defining the structure of our
federal form of government by allocating power between the federal
and state governments.
The problems confronting the Court in federalism cases are of inter-
est to scholars and practitioners alike. For perhaps different purposes,
each group is concerned with discerning patterns and trends in the ad-
judication of federalism cases. Scholars are interested in the soundness
and consistency of federalism doctrine as evidenced by federal court
decisions, and practitioners are interested in past trends as possible
predictive indicators of what a particular Justice, or the Court as a
whole, might decide in future cases.
*B.A., 1969, M.A., 1978, University of Michigan; J.D., 1973, University of Michigan
Law School. Mr. Prygoski is an Assistant Professor, Thomas M. Cooley Law School.
1. Corwin, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Acts of Congress, 4 MICH. L.
REV. 616, 625 (1906) [hereinafter cited as Corwin].
2. In this article, reference is made to the role of the federal judiciary as perceived
by the "Justices," or by the "Supreme Court." These terms are intended to include all
members of the federal bench, including the members of the Supreme Court, who review
acts of Congress in federalism cases.
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The Court performs a monumental task in federalism cases. In addi-
tion to setting the boundaries of federal-state power in a legal sense,
the Court, whether it concedes the fact or not, engages in a considera-
tion and accommodation of sophisticated economic variables.8 In order
better to understand how the Court has analyzed federalism cases, it is
helpful to scrutinize the role of the Court as perceived by its members.
A major problem in analyzing the role of the Court is that its members
have not always been very articulate about what they are doing, why
they are doing it, or in what order they are doing it.'
Perhaps the reason for the lack of clarity in role articulation is that
a concealed bias is the major, largely unspoken premise in federalism
case adjudication.5 The Justices' preconception of the constitutionally
proper division of power between the state and federal governments is
the concealed premise underlying federalism analysis. With the Court's
attention focused primarily on the contours of the congressional power
involved in the case at bar, it is easy to overlook the need for a forth-
right exegesis of federalism concerns from the states' point of view.
While it is easy to refer to the tenth amendment in general, con-
clusory terms as being the source of protection for the continued ex-
istence and sovereignty of states, one must be aware of the nebulous
nature of that claim. The tenth amendment itself" is couched in purely
3. As Felix Frankfurter has commented in relation to the commerce clause:
The history of the commerce clause, from the pioneer efforts of Marshall to our
own day, is the history of imposing artificial patterns upon the play of economic life
whereby an accommodation is achieved between the interacting concerns of states
and nation. The problems of the commerce clause are problems in this process of
accommodation, however different the emphasis of preference of interest, and how-
ever diverse the legal devices by which different judges may make these accommo-
dations.
F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 21-22
(1937) [hereinafter cited as FRANKFURTER].
4. Professor Freund has addressed this problem as follows:
In assessing the claims of local welfare as against the national commercial interest
the Court has been more successful in its pragmatic adjustments than in its explica-
tions. The task presents questions of fact and questions of judgment. When we
speak of judgment, it should be possible to formulate intelligible standards against
which to weigh the facts. Too often the Court has contented itself with such mean-
ingless standards as "direct burden" and "undue burden" on interstate commerce.
Freund, Review and Federalism, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 96-97 (E. Cahn ed.
1954).
5. See Corwin, supra note 1, at 626 ("[I]f most constitutional decisions rest actually
upon a concealed premise, and if the right of the Supreme Court to pass upon the validity
of Congressional legislation must be referred to such a decision, upon what concealed
premise does that decision rest? The answer is: a certain theory of government, embodied
in the Constitution itself.").
6. The tenth amendment provides that "the powers not delegated to the United
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residuary terms, with the states being passively defined in the
residuum and interstices of federal action." Even though the amend-
ment, by its terms, contains no limitation on enumerated congressional
powers, it has been used as the rubric under which implicit notions of
state sovereignty have been imposed by the Court."
To help understand what the Court does in reviewing federalism
cases in which Congress has legislated, an analytical model has been
set up which reflects four major role positions the Court has adopted
vis-a-vis Congress. The model is not intended to be an all-inclusive
analytical tool, but is merely an attempt to characterize the differing
power relationships that may exist between the Court and Congress
whenever the Court exercises its power of judicial review in the con-
text of Congress' impinging upon a state's rights or attributes of
sovereignty. In applying this model, one must keep in mind the differ-
ent interpretations of the tenth amendment that may have been ap-
plied at particular times in the Court's history.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Since it has the power to "say what the law is,"9 the Court itself
determines whether its role will be strong or weak in relation to Con-
gress. The main determinant of the Court's strength or weakness vis-a-
vis Congress in federalism cases is its interpretation of the tenth
amendment. There are no powers inherent in the judiciary which
enable the Court to assume a strong position. If the Court is to con-
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
7. See note 27 and accompanying text infra.
8. Professor Shapiro discusses this judicial technique in relation to Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976):
But unlike both Richardson and LaRue, there is only one passing reference to a
provision of the Constitution as a possible basis for the decision and no quotation of
its language. This is understandable, since the provision in question, the tenth
amendment, is no help .... Clearly the tenth amendment in its terms imposes no
limitations on the exercise of power delegated to the federal government. Indeed,
the decision of the Court that application of the law to state employees engaged in
activities affecting commerce is invalid, while application to private employees
engaged in similar activities is not, seems at odds with the tenth amendment's
equal reservation of powers to the states and to the people. The Court does say
that the invasion of state functions is "not within the authority granted Congress
by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3" (the commerce clause), but the clear import is that implicit
notions of state sovereignty, nowhere expressed in the Constitution, limit the exer-
cise of power under that clause.
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist. A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 306-07 (1976).
9. As Chief Justice Marshall forcefully stated in his opinion in Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), "[it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." Id. at 177.
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front Congress in a federalism case," it must first define the tenth
amendment in such a way as to acknowledge the existence of powers
or attributes of sovereignty that inhere in a state" and act as an affir-
mative limitation upon the power of Congress to regulate activities in-
volving these powers or attributes.
In discussing the Court's review function in the federalism area, two
concepts are of great import: the Court's perception and articulation of
its role under our constitutional system of checks and balances; and
the Court's definition of the tenth amendment as it is factored into the
federal-state calculus of power. It is interesting to speculate which of
these concepts should, or does, come into play first when the Court
reviews congressional action in the federalism area. One could argue
that a preconceived notion of the role of the Court in reviewing
federalism cases should exist and be applied by the Court (or at least
the Justices) in a consistent fashion to all cases before it on appeal.
This approach, which has been approved by at least one commentator,
would lead to a consistency which would in turn enhance the credi-
bility of the Court.12
In addition to an increased appearance of consistency, positing a
perception of the role of the Court as the primary, rather than the sec-
10. The considerations involved in a federalism case are considerably different from
those in a separation of powers case in which the division of power among the three
branches of the federal government is mandated by the Constitution in relatively explicit
terms. In federalism cases the Court must define the tenth amendment, primarily a
residuary source of power for the states, in order to determine the federal-state mix of
power.
11. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged some essential, autonomous attributes of state sovereignty, stating that the
Court has "repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress
may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." Id at 845.
12. Professor Archibald Cox has approved of this approach to the adjudication of
cases involving federalism, reasoning as follows:
The function of the Court-the role implicitly assigned to it by history as well as
the fact of its having been created as a court-is illuminated by contrast with the
political branches. Its decisions are legitimate only when it seeks to dissociate itself
from individual or group interests, and to judge by disinterested and more objec-
tive standards.
The ability to rationalize a constitutional judgment honestly in terms of prin-
ciples referrable to legal precedent and other accepted sources of law is, by the
lawyers' tradition, an essential major ingredient of the Court's power to command
acceptance and support. In the case of judicial rulings the power of legitimacy is
thought to depend largely upon the realization that the major influence in a deci-
sion is not personal fiat,-but principles which bind the judges as well as the liti-
gants, and which apply uniformly to all men not only today but yesterday and
tomorrow.
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 108-09 (1976).
Federalism
ondary, step in the review process enables the Court to consider each
case, or at least to appear to consider each case, in a more objective
fashion, with emphasis on the merits of the case being postponed until
preliminary procedural issues are resolved. Consistency, objectivity,
and credibility are attributes of the judicial process important to prac-
ticing lawyers as well as academicians. The presence of these qualities
enables lawyers to make a reasonable attempt to predict what direc-
tion the Court is taking in the federalism area. However, at certain
points in history, and in certain kinds of cases, the Court's interpreta-
tion of the tenth amendment might have to come before, and perhaps
even dictate the role of the Court.
In some of the early commerce clause cases, the Court invalidated
congressional laws because Congress sought to regulate activities
which the Court viewed as being properly within the purview of state
regulation." At that time, the Court was using the traditional concept
of state sovereignty -that the state, as an essential entity in the
federal system, had certain inherent powers which could not be im-
pinged upon by Congress. In such cases, it could be argued that the
Court's view of state powers was held so strongly as to dictate the
analysis used by the Court to review the case-an absolutist approach
which invalidated the attempted exercise of congressional power
because of a lack of a power source for the legislation.1" The Court's
perception of its role, then, was mainly a function of its view of the
protected areas of state existence and sovereignty. Consideration of
the merits preceded, and in fact decided, any consideration of the
proper role of the Court in hearing appeals in early federalism cases.15
13. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), in which the Supreme Court
invalidated a congressional attempt to reach an activity which was qualitatively local and
therefore outside the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce.
14. The approach used in these cases is sometimes referred to as "pretext analysis,"
a concept which had its origin in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423
(1819). See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
15. For another example of the Court acting in this fashion, one might consider the
language of Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974):
Although the Court made it very explicit in Flast that a "fundamental aspect of
standing" is that it focuses primarily on the party seeking to get his complaint
before the federal court rather than on issues he wishes to have adjudicated," it
made equally clear that
"in ruling on [taxpayer] standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to look
to the substantive issues for another purpose, namely, to determine whether
there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to
be adjudicated."
We therefore turn to an examination of the issues sought to be raised by respon-
dent's complaint to determine whether he is "a proper and appropriate party to in-
voke federal judicial power" with respect to those issues.
Id. at 174 (citations omitted) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)). Also, in National
1980
202 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 18:197
Taxation cases, on the other hand, may require the Court to look
heavily at the merits to determine its role. Since the power to tax is
the power to destroy,"6 the Court may have extra incentive to maintain
a strong judicial presence in tax cases. In addition to the potential
destructiveness of the taxing power, the general bar to taxpayer
standing17 cuts in favor of a consideration of the merits preceding con-
sideration of the judicial role. If any check on the congressional taxing
power is to exist, it may have to flow from the unilateral scrutiny of
congressional purpose by the Court. If the Court declined to scrutinize
congressional purpose at the outset, the result would be that Congress
would have absolutely free rein to enact any manner of regulation
under the rubric of the taxing power. Congressional enactments pur-
suant to other constitutional powers are subject to attack through
regular litigational channels, and if this method of scrutiny is unavail-
able in the taxation area, the Court is the only remaining source of a
check on congressional action.
Allusion to different kinds of cases, each requiring different judicial
treatment on review, is intended to illustrate the difficulty the Court
has in perceiving, articulating, and applying its role in reviewing con-
gressional acts. The following model is an attempt to shed some light
on what the Court has done in dealing with these difficult cases:
THE MODEL
CATEGORY VALIDATION STAGE SCOPE STAGE
One W W
Two W S
Three S W
Four S S
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), Justice Rehnquist concluded that insofar as
the amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act operated to directly displace the
freedom of the states to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions, they were not within the authority granted to Congress by the Constitution. Id.
at 852. The language of this holding, if taken literally, would mean that the Court
assumed for itself a strong role at the outset of the review process.
16. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
17. The general bar to federal taxpayer standing flows from Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), a case in which a federal taxpayer sought to enjoin the Secre-
tary of the Treasury from making expenditures under the Maternity Act of 1921. The
focus of the argument made in that case was that federal expenditures in the area
covered by the Maternity Act, that of reducing maternal and infant mortality, impinged
upon an area reserved to the states. In addition, an individual taxpayer argued that
because of her status as a taxpayer of the United States, application of the Act would
deprive her of property without due process of law, in that the effect of the appropria-
tions would be to increase the burden of future taxation. Id at 486. In rejecting this latter
argument for lack of justiciability, the Court reasoned as follows:
[T]he relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very
different. His interest in the moneys of the Treasury-partly realized from taxation
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There are four basic power arrangements which occur in this model.
The letters used reflect the power of the Court relative to Congress,
with "W" representing a weak Court, and "S" a strong Court. The vali-
dation stage of the model is the point at the outset of the litigation
when the Court determines if Congress had a legitimate constitutional
power source for enacting the law under review. The scope stage is
the point at which the Court determines if the reach of the congres-
sional power is broad enough to encompass the parties or activities
affected by the legislation.
III. MODERN COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
Certain decisions of the Supreme Court stand out as benchmarks in
the federalism area. An analysis of these decisions will help one to
understand the proposed model as an indicator of the ways in which
the Supreme Court might deal with tenth amendment concerns.
In United States v. Darby,18 the Court upheld the application of the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act" to private employers." In
and partly from other sources-is shared with millions of others; is comparatively
minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out
of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an
appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.
Id. at 847. In erecting the rule that a litigant's injury must be suffered by him in a
specific fashion, the Court also noted that a party seeking to invoke the Court's power of
judicial review "must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with peo-
ple generally." Id. at 848.
The general bar to federal taxpayer standing is a prudential, not constitutional limita-
tion on a litigant's ability successfully to invoke a jurisdiction of federal courts. The
prudential nature of the restriction is evident in light of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968),
a case in which the Supreme Court granted standing to a taxpayer who challenged federal
spending as violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment. The contem-
porary attitude regarding the scope of the Flast exception to the Massachusetts v. Mellon
bar to federal taxpayer standing is indicated in Justice Powell's concurrence in United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974):
I would go further than the Court and would lay to rest the approach undertaken
in Flast. I would not overrule FPit on its facts, because it is now settled that
federal taxpayer standing exists in Establishment Clause cases. I would not, how-
ever, perpetuate the doctrinal confusion inherent in the Flast two-part "nexus"
test. That test is not a reliable indicator of when a federal taxpayer has standing,
and it has no sound relationship to the question whether such a plaintiff, with no
other interest at stake, should be allowed to bring suit against one of the branches
of the Federal Government. In my opinion, it should be abandoned.
Id- at 180 (Powell, J., concurring).
18. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216 (1976).
20. As originally enacted, the Fair Labor Standards Act defined "employer" as
follows: "'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
204 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 18:197
1938, Congress enacted the FLSA, which required employers covered
by the Act to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage,2 1 and pro-
vided an overtime rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty per
workweek.' The 1938 Act specifically excluded the states and their
political subdivisions from its coverage. 23 In dismissing the tenth
amendment as an effective limitation on the exercise of enumerated
congressional powers in relation to private parties, the Court in Darby
defined the tenth amendment as a purely residuary source of power
for the states, reasoning that the amendment "states but a truism that
all is retained that has not been surrendered."'" This definition of the
tenth amendment, while implying perhaps the broadest scope for the
federal commerce power,6 was limited only to the situation in which
congressional regulation was aimed at private parties.
employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or any State
or political subdivision of a State .... " Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 3, 52 Stat. 1060.
21. Id. § 6(a), 52 Stat. 1062. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1976).
22. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 7(a)(3), 52 Stat. 1063. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2)(C)
(1976).
23. See note 20 supra.
24. 312 U.S. at 123-24.
25. The scope of the commerce power reflected in this language rivals that of Chief
Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, which is
often considered to be the case which posits the broadest scope ever for the commerce
power, Marshall said:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce which is
carried on between man and man in a state, or between different parts of the same
state, and which does not extend to or affect other states. Such a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
... The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its ac-
tion is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the states generally; but not to those which are completely
within a particular state, which do not affect other states, and with which it is not
necessary to interfere, for the purposes of executing some of the general powers of
the government. The completely internal commerce of a state, then, may be con-
sidered as reserved for the state itself.
Id. at 194-95. One could argue that the concession in Chief Justice Marshall's language,
that such a thing as "completely internal commerce" exists, implies a narrower scope for
the commerce power than that reflected in the commerce cases in the years after 1941.
After the Darby Court defined the tenth amendment as a mere "truism" when applied in
relation to private parties, and the Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942),
acknowledged the "aggregation theory," one would be hard pressed to argue that there
actually was such a thing as the "completely internal commerce of a state." As Frank-
furter has observed, perhaps one of the reasons why Justice Marshall's commerce power
was not as broad as that of the Darby Court was the relatively primitive state of commer-
cial intercourse at the time of Gibbons:
As economic relationships became more interdependent, and the interaction be-
tween state legislation of every kind and interstate commerce became closer, the
central inquiry necessarily shifted from the purpose of state legislation to its effect
upon national commerce. This condition had not become exigent in Marshall's time,
Federalism
In Fry v. United States," the Court upheld the application of the
Economic Stabilization Act' to state and local governmental em-
ployees." That statute authorized the President to issue orders and
regulations to stabilize wages and salaries at certain levels, and led to
the creation of a Pay Board to oversee wage and salary controls im-
posed by the Act.' The Court in Fry, considering the validity of appli-
cations of the commerce power to wholly private activity, said that
"[e]ven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated
by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others
similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign
nations."' While conceding the virtual uselessness of the tenth amend-
ment as a limitation on the exercise of congressional power in relation
to private activity, the Fry Court went on to recognize that provision
as a very real limitation on congressional power when it is used to im-
pair essential attributes of state sovereignty, noting that the tenth
amendment "expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress
may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system." 1 Thus,
while Darby may have resulted in a huge increase in federal power
whenever a private party was subject to a commerce power regulation,
it did not mean that Congress could regulate states or their political
subdivisions so as to affect adversely the states' ability to function as
an independent sovereign in our federal system.
In National League of Cities v. Usery,2 the Burger Court had an
opportunity to expand on the pronouncements made in Fry. Congress,
in 1974, had enacted a series of amendments to the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, which extended the minimum wage and maximum hour pro-
visions to almost all public employees employed by the states and their
political subdivisions. Under the amendments, the definition of "em-
ployer" in that statute specifically included a public agency,' which
was defined as including the federal government, the government of a
state or political subdivision of a state, any federal, state or local
agency, and any interstate governmental agency.3
and he was never called upon to canvass the elements of the problem that must be
considered in determining when a state law in fact unduly burdens commerce.
FRANKFURTER, supra note 3, at 30-31.
26. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
27. Title II of Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970). See 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976).
28. 421 U.S. at 548.
29. See id. at 543-44.
30. IM at 547.
31. Id. at 547 n.7.
32. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976).
34. See id § 203(x).
1980
206 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 18:197
Thus, with the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
Congress entirely removed the exemption previously afforded states
and their political subdivisions, substituting only the statute's general
exemption for executive, administrative, or professional personnel,'
which is supplemented by provisions excluding from the statute's
coverage those individuals holding public elective office or serving
such an officeholder in one of several specific capacities.' The result of
these amendments was to impose upon almost all public employers the
minimum wage and maximum hour requirements previously applicable
only to private employers engaged in interstate commerce. 7
A host of governmental plaintiffs' challenged the 1974 amendments
on the basis that "when Congress seeks to regulate directly the activi-
ties of States as public employers, it transgresses an affirmative
limitation on the exercise of its power akin to other commerce power
affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution."'9 Speaking
through Justice Rehnquist, a majority of the Court"0 held "that insofar
as the challenged amendments operate[d] to directly displace the
states' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions," they exceeded the authority granted to Con-
gress by the Constitution." In reaching that conclusion, Justice Rehn-
quist emphasized the ability of states to provide essential services to
their citizens as being within the area of important governmental func-
tions. 2
35. Id. § 213(a)(1).
36. Id. § 203(e)(2).
37. The 1974 amendments did, however, make some provision for public employment
relationships which are without counterpart in the private sector, such as those involving
fire protection and law enforcement. See i&. § 207(k).
38. For a list of the various parties involved in the appeal to the Supreme Court, see
426 U.S. at 836 n.7.
39. Id. at 841.
40. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell joined the ma-
jority opinion. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices White and Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens also filed a dis-
senting opinion.
41. 426 U.S. at 852.
42. In concluding that extension of the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the states would interfere with integral functions of
local governments, the Court reasoned as follows:
We earlier noted some disagreement between the parties regarding the precise
effect the amendments will have in application. We do not believe particularized
assessments of actual impact are crucial to resolution of the issue presented, how-
ever. For even if we accept appellee's assessments concerning the impact of the
amendments, their application will nonetheless significantly alter or displace the
States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.
Federalism
Despite the fact that the Court has usually spoken of federalism con-
straints based upon notions of state sovereignty and autonomy within
the federal system,' recent theory suggests that an entirely different
basis may exist for tenth amendment federalism concerns-a theory
closely related to the Rehnquist provision-of-services theory of state
sovereignty.
Professors Michelman and Tribe" have posited that, under the tenth
amendment, the citizens of the states have a right to receive certain
important governmental services from the states, and that Congress
may not impair the ability of the states to provide these services. By
way of fleshing out this interpretation of the tenth amendment as a
limitation on congressional power, Tribe has suggested that "a doc-
trine will ultimately emerge that recognizes under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments constitutional rights to decent levels of affirmative
governmental protection in meeting the basic human needs of physical
survival and security, health and housing, employment and education. ' 5
Michelman adds that the Court in National League of Cities was
using "sovereignty" to stand for the state's role of providing for the in-
terests of its citizens in relation to the reception of important social
services. To Michelman, it is the specialized use of the sovereignty con-
cept which permitted the National League of Cities Court to conclude
that states are acting in their sovereign capacities when they empower
municipal governments to contract with municipal employees, and that
Congress, by extending the coverage of the minimum wage law to
state and local governments, had impaired the ability of the states to
function effectively within the federal system of government."
These activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing
public services. Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created
to provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their
citizens. If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those
fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of
these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States' "sepa-
rate and independent existence."
Id. at 851.
43. For a compilation of the Supreme Court decisions involving the traditional notion
of "sovereignty" as being predicated upon the rights of states in a federal system, see
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1068 nn.18 & 19 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as The New Federalism].
44. See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court. 1968 Term-Forwar&. On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Michel-
man, States'Rights and States'Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League
of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Permutations of "Sover-
eignty']; The New Federalism, note 43 supra.
45. The New Federalism, supra note 43, at 1066.
46. Permutations of "Sovereignty," supra note 44, at 1172-73.
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Thus, under the Michelman-Tribe interpretation of state sovereignty
as being inextricably linked to the states' role as provider of essential
services, limitations on congressional action take on a focus decidedly
different from that espoused at other times in the Court's history. This
distinction is of great importance in understanding modern federalism
analysis 7 and how it differs from earlier tenth amendment pronounce-
ments."
IV. THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS
A. Category One
Category One describes the Court at its weakest position. At the
validation stage of this category, the Court is willing to accept the ex-
plicit or implicit congressional statement of the existence of a legiti-
mate constitutional power source.' If the Court does so, it adopts for
itself a deferential, perhaps even obsequious, role in relation to Con-
gress. As mentioned earlier, the doctrine which enables the Court to
flex its judicial muscle is the tenth amendment, and the Court's inter-
pretation of the powers and attributes of sovereignty of a state. In
Category One (as well as Category Two at the validation stage) the
Court, being extremely deferential to congressional will, is going to
give Congress a virtual carte blanche as far as passing legislation af-
fecting the states.
Commerce clause cases from 1942 to 1976 illustrate the Court
operating in a highly non-intrusive fashion,50 thereby maximizing the
47. See note 82 and accompanying text infra.
48. However, for a forceful argument against the Tribe-Michelman theory, see Hunt,
The Lawyers' War Against Democracy, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1979, at 45.
49. In some instances, Congress, through legislative history or some other explicit
means, indicates the constitutional provision upon which it is relying as a source for its
legislation. It does not always do so, however, but this failure to articulate a power source
does not preclude a Court from recognizing that source. For example, in Usery v. Alle-
gheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977), the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized its obligation to attempt to discern the
source of power upon which Congress bases its legislative authority, reasoning as follows:
Nor do we attach any significance to the fact that the legislative history of the
Equal Pay Act does not explicitly rely on the fourteenth amendment. In exercising
the power of judicial review, as distinguished from the power of statutory interpre-
tation, we are concerned with the actual powers of the national government.
Id. at 155.
50. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), Chief Justice
Hughes, writing for the majority, said:
Whether or not particular action does affect commerce in such a close and intimate
fashion as to be subject to federal control, and hence to lie within the authority con-
ferred upon the Board, is left by the statute to be determined as individual cases
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power of Congress in relation to regulation of private activity within
the states. 1 Considering the extremely powerful position of Congress
arise. We are thus to inquire whether in the instant case the constitutional boun-
dary has been passed.
Id. at 32. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court discussed the ability of
Congress, pursuant to the commerce power, to reach local economic activities, stating that
even if an activity is "local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some
earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."' Id- at 125. Later in that opinion,
the Wickard Court appeared to enunciate an "aggregation theory," under which Congress
could reach a local economic activity if the aggregate number of instances of such activity
added up to a "substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce. Id at 127-28 ("That
appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough
to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial"). Thus, even
though the Court purported to retain a "substantiality" requirement in judging when Con-
gress could reach putatively local authorities, the practical application of the requirement
was vitiated by the aggregation theory of Wickard.
In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), Justice Harlan expressed some sensitivity
to the criticism that the aggregation theory of Wickard had made a sham of the substan-
tiality requirement:
Neither here nor in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a rela-
tively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state
or private activities. The Court has said only that where a general regulatory stat-
ute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.
Id. at 197 n.27. One might argue that, rather than restricting the potential applications of
the aggregation theory of Wickard, Justice Harlan's language in Maryland v. Wirtz ex-
panded its potential scope. Wickard appeared to hold that if a certain local economic ac-
tivity were taking place with sufficient frequency, the composite effect of these instances
might serve as a basis for allowing Congress to regulate any instance of such activity
through an invocation of the commerce power. The focus in Wickard was on the individual
actors and their alleged impact on interstate commerce. In Maryland v. Wirtz, the focus
appeared to shift from the actual actors to the congressionally claimed aim of the regula-
tory scheme under review. The practical effect of the Maryland v. Wirtz version of the
aggregation theory is to allow Congress, by legislative averment, to satisfy the substan-
tiality requirement of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin. This modification would appear to ex-
tend the power of Congress to reach previously local activities. See, e.g., Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Taken together, these decisions illustrate the broad sweep of
congressional power recognized by the Supreme Court after 1942. The judicially recog-
nized scope of congressional power in the commerce area was succinctly summarized by
Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, where he
stated that "[u]nder the Constitution the Judiciary has no role to play beyond finding that
Congress has not made an unreasonable legislative judgment respecting what is 'com-
merce."' 426 U.S. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. See Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and
State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Schwartz]. As Professor Schwartz observed:
During the past four decades the Supreme Court has all but overturned the
previous limitations on the exercise of federal authority. So far-reaching had the
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as a result of the Darby interpretation of the tenth amendment, it is
obvious that, as a corollary, the power of the states exclusively to
regulate private economic activities within their borders is at its
minimum. 52
Having defined out of the tenth amendment any limitations on the
commerce power flowing from the exclusive ability of a state to regu-
late local economic or commercial matters, the Court has conceded the
ability of Congress to reach virtually any local activity, as long as a
"close and substantial" relationship exists between the putatively local
activity and interstate commerce.' Since Congress may, with minimal
effort, establish the requisite nexus between the activity sought to be
reached and interstate commerce," the Court has nothing to do at the
validation stage but to concede the existence of a legitimate, Court-
defined constitutional power source.
Once the Court has adopted a non-intrusive role at the validation
stage, it is limited in the further exercise of its review power. The
only avenue open in scrutinizing the validity of a statute's application
is to consider the congressional power in light of countervailing con-
stitutional provisions, the only relevant one being the tenth amend-
ment.
development in this respect become that observers could have asked whether it
portended the replacement of the federal system by a unitary government in which
the states would be reduced to vestigial appendages of an all-powerful nation. If the
states still had "something of the magic of Athens and of Rome," perhaps they
were also destined to share the ultimate fate of those once-flourishing polities, so
far as the reality of governmental power is concerned.
Id at 1115.
52. Professor Schwartz shares this view of the expansiveness of the recent commerce
clause decisions:
Yet, in its recent decisions, the Court has construed the power more broadly than
the great Chief Justice [Marshall] had ever done. "Even a lawyer who fought for a
realistic interpretation which would recognize that in commercial matters the
United States was one nation finds himself surprised at where we are now-and at
how readily the recent expansion is accepted."
Id. at 1124 (quoting Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited- The Federalization of Intra-
state Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 278 (1973)).
53. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
54. The requirement of a "close and substantial" relation to interstate commerce may
be traced to Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), where the
Court defined the legislative authority of Congress as follows:
Its authority, extending to these interstate carriers as instruments of interstate
commerce, necessarily embraces the right to control their operations in all matters
having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is
essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the inter-
state service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate com-
merce may be conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance.
Id at 351.
Federalism
In Category One, once the Court has adopted the Darby view of the
tenth amendment, it will virtually always validate the reach of con-
gressional power at the scope stage, especially in relation to private
activity within a state.' It is possible to argue that the Court has
traditionally used a balancing test in the area of congressional regula-
tion under the commerce clause.5 If this position is accepted, the
Court, in Category One cases, will bring out the judicial scales and
balance tenth amendment concerns against federal powers. The Darby
tenth amendment, however, would weigh nothing and would never act
as an affirmative limitation on congressional regulation in the private
sphere.
Justice Brennan, however, in his dissent in National League of
Cities, perceived a different review role for the Court in federalism
cases where Congress has acted pursuant to a legitimate power source
in relation to private activity. Justice Brennan interpreted the role of
the Court as extending only to the issue of "finding that Congress has
not made an unreasonable legislative judgment respecting what is
'commerce."' 57 His main argument was that the Court's involvement in
a federalism case at the scope stage violates separation of powers prin-
ciples. He contended that once a legitimate power source is found, the
Court should not intrude at all, be it by balancing or any other mode of
analysis.
Whether the Court has traditionally used a balancing test in these
cases at the scope stage, or whether Justice Brennan's characterization
of the Court's role is correct, the result is likely to be the same most of
the time. The Court has defined the tenth amendment and the congres-
55. The significance of the distinction between congressional regulation of private ac-
tivity and regulation of state activity was pointed out by Justice Rehnquist in National
League of Cities v. Usery as follows:
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating indi-
vidual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of
the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a
similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to
the States as States.
426 U.S. at 845.
56. In Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), the seeds of
a balancing analysis are discernible:
We do not think that the Act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh Com-
pany to place a dam across the creek, can, under all the circumstances of the case,
be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant
state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.
Id. at 252 (emphasis added). The Court seemed to imply that, if the facts of the case were
different, perhaps the outcome would also be different. Even though the balancing here is
very unarticulated, it may very well be the progenitor of the sophisticated balancing
analyses that are applied today.
57. 426 U.S. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 50 supra.
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sional power in such a fashion as to grant to Congress maximum power
under the Constitution.
B. Category Two
In this category, the Court does not confront Congress at the valida-
tion stage, but rather concedes that certain activities or people may be
within a congressional power for general purposes. If the Court is to
invalidate the congressional statute, it does so by balancing at the
scope stage. There may exist certain procedural reasons why a Court
would choose to operate in this fashion. If a litigant only has standing
to challenge a statute as applied to him, as opposed to challenging a
statute on its face, the Court will not concern itself with a validation
decision, but will immediately proceed to the scope stage.
An important example of this procedure is seen in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,"s a case in which Oklahoma state employees challenged a
state law 9 restricting their political activities. The Oklahoma law,
which was patterned after section 9(a) of the Hatch Act,"' was attacked
on the basis that "its language [was] unconstitutionally vague and its
prohibitions too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between
conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted."'"
The Court rejected the facial overbreadth challenge, 2 and upheld
the provisions of the state law." In so doing, the Court spent little
time in establishing the threshold validity of the statute in question,
concluding that it was "all but frivolous" to suggest that the section
fails to give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails
58. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
59. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 74, § 818 (West 1976).
60. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976). Section 9(a) prohibits federal employees from taking
"an active part in political management or in political campaigns." Id In a case decided
the same day as Broadrick, the Supreme Court upheld the Hatch Act against challenges
that it was unconstitutionally vague. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
61. 413 U.S. at 607.
62. Id at 610. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute against the over-
breadth argument, the Broadrick Court reasoned as follows:
[Appellants] are charged with actively engaging in partisan political activities-in-
cluding the solicitation of money-among their coworkers for the benefit of their
superior. Appellants concede ... that § 818 would be constitutional as applied to
this kind of conduct. They nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and
purports to reach protected, as well as unprotected conduct, and must therefore be
struck down on its face and held to be incapable of any constitutional application.
We do not believe that the overbreadth doctrine may appropriately be invoked in
this manner here.
Id
63. Id at 618.
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to set out 'explicit standards' for those who must apply it."" Having
rejected the' appropriateness of a facial attack on the statute in the
case at bar, and having limited its applicability in general, 5 the Court
went on to focus on the applicability of the statute to the actions of
the litigants, stating that even though the extreme boundaries of the
statute were arguably imprecise, that consideration was irrelevant,
because the appellants had conceded that their conduct fell "squarely
within the 'hard core' of the statute's proscriptions."'
Thus, when the Court is limited to entertaining a challenge to a
statute as applied to a particular litigant, there is no reason for it to
assume a strong role at the validation stage. Major scrutiny is re-
served for a consideration of the proper scope of the statute under
review.
Another procedural limitation on the nature of the review exercised
by the Supreme Court may flow from the manner in which issues are
framed in the trial record. Such a limitation is exemplified by the
Supreme Court's decision in Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant 7
In that case, while defining the proper jurisdictional avenue of
Supreme Court review, Justice Van Devanter stated that "in cases
where the validity of a state statute is drawn in question because of
alleged repugnance to the Constitution, the mode of review depends on
the way in which the state court resolved the question.""M Discussing
the issues properly subject to its review, the Court noted that it does
not matter whether a statute under review is alleged to be invalid for
every purpose, since a statute could be invalid as applied to one set of
facts and valid as applied to another set.69 Moreover, "a litigant can be
heard to question a statute's validity only when and so far as it is
being or is about to be applied to his disadvantage."70
Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in Dahnke-Walker, argued that the
classification of the case as involving either obligatory or discretionary
Supreme Court review was an important policy decision with great im-
port for workload and the role of the Court." He objected strongly to
64. Id. at 607.
65. Id at 615 ("To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep").
66. Id. at 608.
67. 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
68. Id at 289.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 294 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The steady increase of the business of this
court has made it necessary to limit the appellate jurisdiction in cases arising under § 237
[of the Judicial Code]. To this end, Congress determined in 1916 that even cases involving
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what he perceived to be an unwarranted expansion of Supreme Court
review of questions concerning "merely the propriety of the particular
use of [a] statute, or of the manner of applying or administering it."7 2 If
the Brandeis warning is to be heeded, there may be important policy
reasons for the Supreme Court to curtail its involvement in reviewing
the scope of certain legislation before it.7" Even though Dahnke-Walker
concerned the review of a case involving a state statute, it is impor-
tant for purposes of the model because of the congressional grant of
jurisdiction involved.7 4
In addition to these procedurally-based decisions in which the Court
has adopted a position reflecting the power relationship of this cate-
gory, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in National League of Cities7
illustrates a judicial approach that reflects this power relationship.
After construing Justice Rehnquist's opinion to reflect a balancing ap-
proach,76 Justice Blackmun concurred in the result reached by the
majority opinion. In so doing, Justice Blackmun conceded, at the vali-
dation stage, the ability of Congress to reach some people and activi-
constitutional questions should be reviewed here only where the public interest appeared
to demand it.").
72. Id.
73. For a discussion of the Dahnke-Walker decision, see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 637-40 (2d ed. 1973).
74. The statute involved in Dahnke- Walker was § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended
by Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726. See 257 U.S. at 288. For the current version
of § 237, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
75. Mr. Justice Blackmun expressed his views concerning the majority opinion as
follows:
The Court's opinion and the dissents indicate the importance and significance of
this litigation as it bears upon the relationship between the Federal Government
and our States. Although I am not troubled by certain possible implications of the
Court's opinion-some of them suggested by the dissents-I do not read the opin-
ion so despairingly as does my Brother Brennan. In my view, the result with
respect to the statute under challenge here is necessarily correct. I may misinter-
pret the Court's opinion but it seems to me that it adopts a balancing approach,
and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection,
where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility com-
pliance with imposed federal standards would be essential. . . . With this under-
standing on my part of the Court's opinion, I join it.
National League of Cities 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
76. Lower courts have attempted to construe National League of Cities in such a
way as to preserve the ability of Congress to legislate under the commerce clause. See,
e.g., Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112, 113 (C.D. Cal. 1977) ("The
Court's rationale in League of Cities was not that the attempted extension of federal
authority reached activities beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause .. . but that such
extension ran afoul of our federal system's limitation 'upon the authority of Congress to
regulate the activities of States as States"').
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ties when federal concerns are significant in relation to the state or
local interests affected by the legislation. However, on the facts of the
case, Justice Blackmun joined in repudiating the congressional attempt
to extend the Fair Labor Standards Act amendments to state and local
governmental employees.
In National League of Cities, then, Justice Blackmun perceived the
role of the Court to be a weak one at the initial stage of scrutiny, but a
strong one at the scope stage. It would appear that he is therefore
willing to assert tenth amendment interests of local governmental
units as affirmative limitations upon congressional power. From the
point of view of purely practical jurisprudence, the Blackmun approach
may be an extremely workable one. It would define the contours of
state-sovereignty limitations on federal power by applying a balancing
analysis on a case-by-case basis.
77
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in National League of Cities,7  was
disturbed by the potentially far-reaching effects of the plurality hold-
ing. His concern was that if the people whom Congress attempted to
reach by the Fair Labor Standards Act amendments were completely
immune from congressional reach, then concerns which are clearly
within the purview of Congress would not be subject to regulation."
77. This type of approach is consistent with the approach taken earlier by Felix
Frankfurter. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 3, at 34 ("In the history of the Supreme Court
no single quality more differentiates judges than the acuteness of their realization that
practical considerations, however screened by doctrine, underlie resolution of conflicts
between state and national power").
78. Justice Stevens would have upheld the statute on the basis of the federal govern-
ment's power over the labor market:
On this issue there is no dissent from the proposition that the Federal
Government's power over the labor market is adequate to embrace these em-
ployees. Since I am unable to identify a limitation on that federal power that would
not also invalidate federal regulation of state activities that I consider unquestion-
ably permissible, I am persuaded that this statute is valid. Accordingly, with
respect and a great deal of sympathy for the views expressed by the Court, I dis-
sent from its constitutional holding.
426 U.S. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens characterized the interest of
the federal government in regulating the employment relationship between a state and its
employees as follows:
The Federal Government may, I believe, require the State to act impartially
when it hires or fires the janitor, to withhold taxes from his paycheck, to observe
safety regulations when he is performing his job, to forbid him from burning too
much soft coal in the capitol furnace, from dumping untreated refuse in an adjacent
waterway, from overloading a state-owned garbage truck or from driving either the
truck or the governor's limousine over 55 miles an hour. Even though these and
many other activities of the capitol janitor are activities of the State qua State, I
have no doubt that they are subject to federal regulation.
Id at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan, in a separate dissenting opinion, expressed some of
the same concerns as Justice Stevens. He pointed out that the plural-
ity holding could signal the abandonment of the previously unchal-
lenged principle that Congress has the power to entirely displace state
regulation to the full extent of the far-reaching commerce clause. To
Justice Brennan, this federal power to displace state laws was a neces-
sary corollary to the principles of federalism embodied in the supremacy
clause of the Constitution. 0
Justice Brennan's point is an interesting one. His concern seems to
be based on the notion that if Congress is unable to regulate wages
and hours of state employees because those issues are essential attri-
butes of state sovereignty, then Congress would be even less able to
regulate state criminal matters because they are of even greater
significance to the existence of a state.8 However, the analogy be-
tween congressional regulation of state employees' wages and hours,
and congressional regulation of local criminal activity breaks down in
at least three major ways.
First of all, congressional regulation of local criminal activity is
directed at private parties-the criminals. While this may be a federal
intervention in an area traditionally regulated by the states, there is
80. Id. at 875 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Justice Stewart expressed the same concern in his dissenting opinion in Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971):
Congress surely has power under the Commerce Clause to enact criminal laws
to protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, to prohibit the misuse of
the channels of facilities of interstate commerce, and to prohibit or regulate those
intrastate activities that have a demonstrably substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. But under the statute before us a man can be convicted without any proof of
interstate movement, of the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or of facts
showing that his conduct affected interstate commerce. I think the Framers of the
Constitution never intended that the National Government might define as a crime
and prosecute such wholly local activity through the enactment of federal criminal
laws.
In order to sustain this law we would, in my view, have to be able at the least
to say that Congress could rationally have concluded that loan sharking is an ac-
tivity with interstate attributes that distinguish it in some substantial respect from
other local crime. But it is not enough to say that loan sharking is a national prob-
lem, for all crime is a national problem. It is not enough to say that some loan
sharking has interstate characteristics, for any crime may have an interstate set-
ting. And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse impact on interstate
business is not a distinguishing attribute, for interstate business suffers from
almost all criminal activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the streets. Because I am
unable to discern any rational distinction between loan sharking and other local
crime, I cannot escape the conclusion that this statute was beyond the power of
Congress to enact. The definition and prosecution of local, intrastate crime are
reserved to the States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Id. at 157-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
1980 Federalism 217
no direct congressional regulation of states, as in National League of
Cities. Secondly, congressional regulation of local crime would be in an
area in which states would have no good practical reason for asserting
their tenth amendment powers as affirmative limitations on congres-
sional power, since states are not likely to oppose federal aid to help
combat local crime. Finally, the Michelman-Tribe interpretation of the
sovereignty of a state being a function of providing essential services
would obviate the Brennan problem entirely." Congress could continue
to regulate crime and other "morals" issues not because those issues
partake less of state sovereignty than does the FLSA issue in National
League of Cities, but because Congress would be supplementing, not
curtailing, the state's provision of service in these areas." Thus,
Justice Brennan's concern would be a real problem only if the Court
were to construe state sovereignty in a traditional fashion; he ignores
other issues such as practical as opposed to theoretical federalism, and
the provision and receipt of services aspects of statehood.
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan's fears, however, if the Court acts
in a Weak-Strong position, as reflected in Justice Blackmun's opinion,
it may continue to limit, in a pragmatic fashion, what it sees as con-
gressional excesses. To someone like Justice Brennan, the continued
judicial presence required by the Blackmun approach is theoretically
unsound, but it may work very well in today's world of extensive con-
gressional involvement in all areas of local governmental and private
life.
C. Category Three
In this category, the Court assumes a strong role at the outset of
the review procedure by engaging in an independent scrutiny of the
existence of a legitimate constitutional power source for the congres-
sional legislation. Within this category (and in Category Four) the
Court adopts a strong role for itself at the validation state.u
82. See notes 43-45 & 47 supra.
83. See Permutations of "Sovereignty, " supra note 44, at 1174 ("The Amendment can
thus serve in the argument not as a source of legally deducible states' rights, but as a
warning or reminder that affairs for which Congress is not held accountable-either in
legal contemplation or in political practice-are also affairs in which Congress should
generally not interfere").
84. The main common law source of this judicial power is the decision in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), in which Chief Justice Marshall stated:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are pro-
hibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the govern-
ment, it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a decision come before it, to say such an act was not the law of the land.
Id. at 423.
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When the Court is functioning in Categories Three or Four, it will
be willing to engage in a pretext analysis of the congressional power
source. Once the Court has "pretext-analyzed" the congressional power
source, it will then shift gears to a deferential position at the scope
stage. At the second phase of a Category Three review, the Court will
be very reluctant to limit the congressional power it has just recog-
nized at the validation stage.
It is illuminating to consider two of Justice Frankfurter's tax opin-
ions as a composite example of how a Court would function within this
phase of the model. In United States v. Kahriger 5 Justice Frank-
furter, in a dissenting opinion, discussed the review role of the Court
when determining whether Congress has a legitimate, constitutionally-
based power source for its legislation, noting that the Court cannot
automatically approve congressional action which may infringe upon
the regulatory responsibility of the states merely because of the
characterization of that action as a revenue measure:
Congress may make an oblique use of the taxing power in relation to ac-
tivities with which Congress may deal directly, as for instance, commerce
between the States .... However, when oblique use is made of the taxing
power as to matters which substantively are not within the powers dele-
gated to Congress, the Court cannot shut its eyes to what is obviously,
because designedly, an attempt to control conduct which the Constitution
left to the responsibility of the States, merely because Congress wrapped
the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue measure.
Concededly the constitutional questions presented by such legislation
are difficult. On the one hand, courts should scrupulously abstain from
hobbling congressional choice of policies, particularly when the vast reach
of the taxing power is concerned. On the other hand, to allow what other-
wise is excluded from congressional authority to be brought within it by
casting legislation in the form of a revenue measure could ... offer an
easy way for the legislative imagination to control "any one of the great
number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the States
have never parted with .... ""
These statements indicate that Justice Frankfurter envisioned a
strong role for the Court vis-a-vis Congress. He considered it the
Court's duty to scrutinize the congressional enactment to ensure the
existence of a legitimate congressional power source.
Once the analysis had proceeded beyond the validation stage to the
scope stage, Justice Frankfurter perceived a different role for the
Court. Speaking for a plurality of the Court in New York v. United
States,7 Justice Frankfurter recognized that Congress' power to tax is
85. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
86. 1& at 37-38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S.
20, 38 (1922)).
87. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
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no greater than the power to regulate commerce, but concluded that as
long as Congress taxes a source of revenue which is not uniquely
capable of being earned by a state, then the revenue measure cannot
be held unconstitutional merely because its reach also extends to a
state:
We have already held that by engaging in the railroad business a State
cannot withdraw the railroad from the power of the federal government
to regulate commerce. Surely the power of Congress to lay taxes has im-
pliedly no less a reach than the power of Congress to regulate commerce.
There are, of course, State activities and State-owned property that par-
take of uniqueness from the point of view of intergovernmental relations.
These inherently constitute a class by themselves. Only a State can own a
Statehouse; only a State can get income by taxing. These could not be in-
cluded for purposes of federal taxation in any abstract category of tax-
payers without taxing the State as a State. But so long as Congress
generally taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely
capable of being earned only by a State, the Constitution of the United
States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on a
State."
Justice Frankfurter's statements in New York v. United States indi-
cate that once the Court has acknowledged the essential tax nature of
a congressional enactment, the scope of the congressional taxing power
is the same as that of the commerce power. Juxtaposition of these two
statements, which were made at a time when the commerce power was
arguably at the maximum scope in its history," indicates that in tax
cases, Justice Frankfurter would have adopted a role for the Court
similar to that reflected in Category Three of our model. The Court,
through its pretext analysis, would be strong at the validation stage,
but would then soften its position at the scope stage to allow Congress
great leeway in fashioning and applying tax measures.
Categories Three and Four will be applicable almost exclusively in
cases in which Congress has acted under its taxing power. The especially
potent nature of the taxing power, coupled with the general bar to tax-
payer standing, are responsible for the Court assuming a strong posi-
tion at the validation stage." It would be rare if today's Court used an
absolutist approach on a regular basis to invalidate congressional
action under the commerce power.91
88. Id. at 582 (citations omitted).
89. See note 28 supra.
90. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
91. But see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In Katzenbach, the Court indicated a
limited role for itself in reviewing determinations of Congress dealing with the effect of
an activity on commerce, stating:
Of course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be
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D. Category Four
This category is the one which reflects the strongest position the
Court may assume for itself in relation to Congress. The Court is will-
ing to scrutinize the alleged congressional power source, and is also
willing to exert a considerable degree of judicial power at the scope
stage. A recent Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. United
States," illustrates how the Court might function in a manner consis-
tent with the strong position Category Four describes.
In Massachusetts v. United States, the issue was whether Congress
could constitutionally impose an annual "flat fee" registration tax on
all civil aircraft that fly in the navigable airspace of the United States,
including those aircraft owned by the federal or state governments.
After paying under protest the registration fee which had been levied
on a helicopter used exclusively for state police functions, Massachu-
setts sued the United States for a refund, arguing that the United
States could not constitutionally impose a tax that directly affects the
essential and traditional state function of operating a police force."
The Court held that the registration tax, being only a user fee,9' did
not violate the implied immunity of a state government from federal
taxation . 5
For purposes of the model, it is interesting to consider what the
Justices did at each stage of the review process. The initial premise of
the Court's role at the validation stage was to determine if Congress
had a legitimate power source for passing the legislation in question.
One way a Court may help to answer this question is to consider the
purpose of the congressional enactment.
Writing for the majority of the Court in Part I of the opinion,
Justice Brennan concluded that the financing measures at issue in
Massachusetts v. United States were designed to serve two purposes.
deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by this Court.
But where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before
them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the
protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.
Id. at 303-04.
92. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
93. Id, at 452. It is obvious that Massachusetts, in challenging the tax on its police
aircraft, was relying on the rights of a state qua state to function in the federal system.
Under the Michelman-Tribe approach, there was no impairment of the state's ability to
provide essential service to its citizens. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
94. 435 U.S. at 471.
95. Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's plurality opinion.
Justices Stewart and Powell joined in Parts I, II-C, and III of the plurality opinion,
specifically disavowing any need to discuss the issue of implied intergovernmental im-
munity. Id. at 470-71 (Stewart and Powell, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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First, they effectuated the congressional policy of placing the burden
of the cost of governmental activity upon those who derive special
benefits from that activity." Second, the financing measures ensured
that the capacity of the national airstream would not be insufficient to
meet the demands of increasing use." It followed from this determina-
tion that the trust fund and user fee had been established "to provide
funding for aviation that would generally match and grow with the de-
mand for use of the airways."'" Thus, the primary purpose of the regis-
tration tax was found by the Court to be that of revenue raising. This
being the case, the Court should have, and did, sustain the measure as
a valid exercise of the taxing power.
As it does in any tax case, the Court inquired into congressional pur-
pose to ensure that a legitimate tax measure has been passed by Con-
gress. As indicated in the discussion pertaining to Category Three, the
Court's willingness independently to scrutinize congressional purpose
reflects a strong role for the Court at the outset of the review pro-
cedure. In Category Four, however, the Court also acts forcefully at
the scope stage of the judicial review process. In order to obtain a
complete understanding of this process, it is necessary to examine the
test the Court uses when deciding if Congress appropriately legislated
in regard to the state activities involved in the litigation.
In Massachusetts v. United States, Justice Brennan posited a three-
prong test to determine if a state has a valid objection to a revenue
measure applied to integral attributes of state sovereignty:
So long as the charges do not discriminate against state functions, are
based on a fair approximation of use of the system, and are structured to
produce revenues that will not exceed the total cost to the Federal
Government of the benefits to be supplied, there can be no substantial
basis for a claim that the National Government will be using its taxing
powers to control, unduly interfere with, or destroy a State's ability to
perform essential services."
For the purpose of our analysis, the question becomes whether this
three-prong test allows the Court to adopt a strong role at the scope
96. Id. at 448.
97. Id at 449.
98. Id. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3047, 3051-55 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 91-601].
99. 435 U.S. at 466-67. It should be noted that this is a slight variation of a test used
by the Court in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707 (1972). In that case, the Court upheld a $1.00 municipal head tax on enplaning
commercial air passengers because the tax was designed to recoup the cost of airport
facilities. In Evansville, the first prong of the test was whether the local tax discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce and travel. See id. at 717. The Court in Massachusetts
v. United States simply substituted "state functions" for "interstate commerce." See 435
U.S. at 466.
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stage of review. It is clear from Justice Rehnquist's dissent"® that a
Justice who holds a strong view of the tenth amendment may very
well opt for a strong Court in determining whether Congress has acted
appropriately under its legitimate taxing power.
The test, as a potential check on the power of Congress to extend
its taxing power as far as it pleases, will mean different things to dif-
ferent Justices. Justice Brennan, for example, is a Justice who has
usually given extremely broad latitude to Congress in the exercise of
its powers in relation to the states, and who is not concerned about the
potential overcharge to a particular state. All he is concerned about is
that the charges "are based on a fair approximation of use of the
system. '1 0'
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, would require that states have
the opportunity to prove that the fee charged by the federal govern-
ment's taxing scheme is excessive."' More importantly, if one considers
the Court's strength or weakness as a function of its willingness to
defer to congressional claims of power, Justice Rehnquist makes an
even more telling point. Referring to the paucity of factual findings in
Massachusetts v. United States, and the majority's indifference to that
paucity, he stated that he could not accept congressional statements
which merely assert that a particular tax was generally viewed as a
user charge.0 3
Justice Rehnquist's position is one that would require the Court to
confront Congress directly at both stages of the review process. At the
outset, the Court would pretext-analyze to see if Congress were legis-
lating pursuant to a legitimate power source. Then, at the scope stage,
the Court would require more than a mere allegation of legality by
Congress, and would give the states the opportunity to prove that the
law has been unconstitutionally applied to them. The continued scru-
tiny of the Rehnquist approach is relatively intrusive, and reflects
tighter judicial control in the latter stages of review. This position
obviously reflects the Court operating at or near its maximum power
in relation to Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that as the analysis progresses through the various
categories of the proposed model, the stance taken by the Court in
100. Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion.
101. 435 U.S. at 466.
102. Id. at 473 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 474 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's reference was to the ma-
jority's reliance on H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, note 98 supr(. See 435 U.S. at 499 n.6.
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relation to Congress may vary greatly. The model is instructive not
only because it reflects what the Court has done in federalism cases in
the past, but also because it may indicate what a given Justice, and
therefore the Court as a whole, will do in the future.
The model, not to mention the need for such a model, intimates that
the Court is engaged in a complex exercise when it reviews acts of
Congress that adversely affect the states. Felix Frankfurter astutely
described the function of the Court in this area as being an "exercise
in statesmanship" and judicial statecraft:
The constitutional labors of the Supreme Court, especially with the com-
merce clause, are accurately described as statecraft. But it is an exercise
in statesmanship hemmed in by the restrictions attending the adjudica-
tory process. Far-reaching political principles arise through the accidents
of unrelated and intermittent cases, presenting issues confined by the ex-
igencies of the legal record, depending for elucidation upon the learning
and insight of counsel fortuitously selected for a particular case, and im-
prisoning the judgment, at least in part within legal habituations and past
utterances. '
The direction of judicial statecraft in the federalism area is, to a large
degree, dependent upon how the Justices perceive the ideal structure
of our federal government.15 Clarity in articulation and consistency of
application of the underlying principles of federalism should be the
primary attributes of judicial review in federalism cases.
104. FRANKFURTER, supra note 3, at 22.
105. See notes 1 & 5 and accompanying text supra.
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